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Abstract 
Using survey data from firms around the world I analyze how detection of bribery has impacted a firm’s 
competitiveness over the past year. Managers report that the most significant impact was on employee 
morale, followed by business relations, and then reputation and regulatory relations. The impact on stock 
price has been much less significant and this could be attributed to stock prices not reflecting the impact 
on employee morale and business relations in less competitive labor and product markets. To better 
understand these bribery cases I analyze detailed data on the identity of the main perpetrator, detection 
method and organizational response following detection and find that both the method of detection and 
how an organization responds are systematically related to the seniority or type of the perpetrator. Finally, 
I examine how these factors are associated with the impact on competitiveness and find that internally 
initiated bribery from senior executives is more likely to be associated with a significant impact on firm 
competitiveness. Bribery detected by the control systems of the firm is less likely to be associated with a 
significant impact on regulatory relations. Finally, bribery cases where the main perpetrator is dismissed 
are less likely to be associated with a significant impact on firm competitiveness. These results shed light 
on the costs of bribery after detection. 
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  seeks  to  provide  evidence  on  three  questions.  First,  what  is  the  impact  on  a  company’s 
competitiveness, in terms of reputation, business and regulatory relations, and employee morale, after 
detection of bribery and how this impact affects a firm’s stock price? Second, how does the seniority or 
type (for example customer vs. supplier) of the main perpetrator relates to the method through which the 
bribe was detected and how the organization responded after detection? Third, how does the seniority or 
type  of  the  main  perpetrator,  detection  method,  and  organizational  response  as  well  as  other  firm 
characteristics relate to the impact on a firm’s competitiveness? 
I  use  throughout  the  paper  the  term  competitiveness  to  refer  to  four  factors  that  have  been 
associated  in  the  literature  with  building  a  sustainable  competitive  advantage;  corporate  reputation, 
employee  morale,  business  relations,  and  regulatory  relations.  Good  reputation  allows  a  company  to 
attract  high  quality  human  capital,  charge  premium  prices,  create  customer  loyalty,  and  expand 
geographically.  High  employee  morale  is  related  to  high  productivity,  creativity  and  innovation,  all 
significantly affecting the growth of a company. Good business relations enable a company to build a 
robust supply chain, lower costs, avoid operating disruptions, and establish a satisfied and loyal customer 
base while good regulatory relations secure a firm’s license to operate avoiding excessive regulatory costs 
and fines, and allow the firm to gain access to new markets and grow across geographies.  
In this study, detected cases of bribery refer to all cases that are detected either by the firm or by 
actors outside the boundaries of the firm; not just cases detected by regulators that have been frequently 
used in past studies. I focus on bribery because it is widespread around the world, illegal, detrimental to 
economic progress and social stability, and at the same time it can have clear economic benefits for a firm 
(Healy and Serafeim 2013).
1 However, while the benefits of bribery for a firm, through acquisition of 
contracts or avoidance of government bureaucracy, are intuitive and well documented (Cheung, Rau, and 
Stouraitis, 2012), the costs after detection are less well understood (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2013). 
                                                           
1 The World Bank estimates that more than $1 trillion are paid in bribes every year. 3 
 
Detection  can  significantly  impact  a  firm’s  competitiveness  both  because  of  regulatory  and 
market forces. The illegality of the action initiates a legal and regulatory battle. Consider for example, the 
case of Siemens and its multi-year and jurisdictional legal battle with law enforcement and regulatory 
authorities that led the firm to incur billions in costs in the form of fines or expenses from organizational 
restructuring. At the same time, employees, customers, suppliers, investors, and the general public are all 
likely to express their dissatisfaction. Consider for example, how the bribery scandal at Alstom, the 
French maker of trains and turbines, caused the Ethics Council of the Norwegian Pension Fund, to put 
Alstom under review for four years due to what the Norwegian finance ministry said was the risk of gross 
corruption  in  the  company’s  operations.
2  Alstom responded stating that such , unfair according to 
company executives, moves by large institutional investors were affecting the reputation of the firm and 
its future competitiveness.  As a result, both   regulatory and market   forces are likely to affect the 
competitiveness of the company.  
 Several studies attempt to draw conclusions from stock market reactions about the impact of 
bribery detection on firm competitiveness with conflicting results. Smith, Stettler, and Beedles  (1984) 
examine share price reactions to announcements by 98 firms that voluntarily reported payments to foreign 
government officials during the SEC’s pre-FCPA amnesty program that ended in 1978. The average stock 
price reaction is negative leading the authors to conclude that this reflects investors’ expectations of 
future government sanctions or the loss of future business. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2013) examine the 
stock market response to firms prosecuted for foreign bribery and find that their stock price declines by 
3.11%, on average, on the first day that news of the bribery enforcement action is reported, and by 8.98% 
over  all  announcements  related  to  the  enforcement  action.  However,  they  find  that  most  bribery 
enforcement actions are co-mingled with charges of financial misrepresentation and fraud, and that most 
of these firms’ costs are due to the financial violations, not the bribery charges per se.  
                                                           
2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/06/norway-fund-idUSL5E7N62LI20111206 
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The confounding of bribery with other violations of the law is one problem  for studies that 
attempt  to  draw  inferences  from  stock  price  reactions.  The  radically  different  regulatory  and  social 
context  within  which  bribery  happens  is  another  one.  Enforcement  against  bribery  cases  was  barely 
existent before 2007, but it is now much more frequent in some jurisdictions (Healy and Serafeim, 2013). 
Moreover, efforts in the last ten years by numerous civil society and private organizations, along with 
government  initiatives  to  promote  responsible  business  practices  under  the  umbrella  of  ‘corporate 
sustainability’ are changing the business landscape. Specifically, companies that operate responsibly are 
more likely to enjoy advantages in product, labor and capital markets (Cheng et al. 2014; Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2014; Eccles et al. 2014). Therefore, inferences drawn from bribery cases that were detected 
even ten years ago is unlikely to be applicable to the current business environment. Moreover, it is not 
clear that investors are able to understand how the firm’s long-run competitiveness and specifically its 
business  relations,  reputation,  regulatory  relations,  and  employee  morale  are  affected  by  the  bribery 
incident. Corporate managers are much more likely to be able to understand those effects and provide an 
assessment.  
To overcome these challenges I use proprietary survey data, from 2009 and 2011, provided by 
PwC  that  surveyed  its  clients  on  bribery  incidences.  Managers  identified  their  companies  as  having 
experienced a bribery incident, as well as who was the main perpetrator of the bribery incident, how it 
was detected, and how the firm responded. Moreover, managers assess the significance of the impact of 
the bribery incident and discovery on the firm’s competitiveness and its stock price over the last 12 
months. Using data from recent years about the impact on firm competitiveness and for bribery cases that 
do not involve accounting fraud or other instances of economic crime allows me to answer the three 
questions I described above; which competitiveness factors are impacted the most and how the impact on 
them relates to the impact on the stock price, who is the main perpetrator and how detection method and 
organizational  response  vary  with  the  identity  of  the  perpetrator,  and  how  the  impact  on  the 
competitiveness factors varies with the identity of the perpetrator, detection method and organizational 
response. 5 
 
The  results  suggest  that  the  most  significant  impact  from  bribery  detection  is  on  employee 
morale. The second most significant impact is on business relations. Reputation and regulatory relations 
are both ranked last in terms of impact. The impact on stock price is far less significant according to 
managers. I associate the impact on stock price with the impact on the competitiveness factors and find 
that the lower significance for stock price impact can be explained by stock prices not reflecting the 
impact  on  employee  morale  and  business  relations.  Rather  stock  prices  only  reflect  the  impact  on 
reputation and regulatory relations; the two less significantly impacted factors. A potential explanation for 
this result is that although the detection of bribery significantly impacts employee morale and business 
relations, this impact does not significantly affect a firm’s future profitability and risk because of frictions 
in labor and product markets. I find evidence consistent with this explanation. In countries with more 
competitive labor markets there is a stronger association between employee morale impact and stock 
price impact. Similarly, in countries with more competitive product markets there is a stronger association 
between business relations impact and stock price impact.  
Because there is significant variation in the characteristics of each bribery case I proceed to 
analyze who was the main perpetrator, how the bribe was detected, and how the organization responded. 
Sixty-seven percent of the cases in my sample have a main perpetrator who is an employee of the firm, 
versus  33  percent  that  have  a  main  perpetrator  who  is  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  firm.  Middle 
managers are the most frequent perpetrators among employees of the firm with junior staff being the 
second  most  frequent  and  senior  executives  the  least  frequent.  Government  employees  are  the  most 
frequent  perpetrators  among  outside  actors,  with  customers,  agents/intermediaries  of  the  firm,  and 
suppliers following in terms of frequency. Both formal (i.e., anticorruption and security systems) and 
informal (i.e., tip-offs and whistle-blowers) control systems of the firm are more likely to detect bribery 
when the main perpetrator is an employee of the firm. However, in cases where middle managers are the 
main  perpetrators,  formal  internal  control  systems  are  less  frequently  the  method  of  detection  with 
informal control systems and the media and law enforcement being  more frequently the methods of 
detection. Among, outside perpetrators, government employees are more likely to be detected by the 6 
 
media  or  law  enforcement  rather  than  the  formal  control  systems  of  the  firm.  These  findings  are 
consistent with formal control systems being less effective as means of detection of bribery when the 
main  perpetrators  are  middle  managers,  who  have  deep  expertise  in  the  same  control  systems,  and 
government employees, who senior executives are probably already aware of and as a result revelation is 
more  likely  to  come  from  non-firm  actors.  In  terms  of  organizational  response,  I  find  that  internal 
perpetrators are significantly more likely to be fired compared to the probability of ceasing relations with 
outside perpetrators. However, the firm is less likely to initiate legal action and fire a senior executive 
compared to junior staff and middle managers. These findings suggest that senior executives are treated 
with  more  leniency.  The  same  findings  apply  to  government  employee  perpetrators  compared  to 
customers,  suppliers  or  agents  of  the  firm.  This  might  reflect  the  higher  bargaining  power  that 
government employees have over the firm compared to other outside stakeholders. 
I find evidence that the impact of bribery detection on reputation and employee morale is more 
likely to be significant when the perpetrator is internal rather than external to the firm. Moreover, the 
impact is more likely to be significant if the internal perpetrator is part of the senior management. This is 
the case for the impact on reputation, regulatory relations, and business relations. In addition, I find that 
regulatory relations are less likely to be affected if bribery was detected by the formal or informal control 
systems of the company. This result suggests that regulators are likely to take into account the quality of a 
firm’s control systems when they decide on disciplinary action. A firm’s response to the discovery of 
bribery  is  also  significantly  associated  with  the  impact  on  competitiveness.  Consistently,  firms  that 
dismiss internal perpetrators or cease relations with external find the impact on competitiveness to have 
been less significant. Specifically, when the perpetrator is internal and the person is dismissed, the impact 
on reputation, regulatory relations, and employee morale is less likely to be significant. Similarly, if the 
perpetrator is external and the person is dismissed, the impact on reputation and employee morale is less 
likely to be significant. This provides evidence that dismissal of internal or external perpetrators could be 
an effective mechanism to restrict the damage on a firm’s competitiveness. Moreover, I find that larger 
firms find the impact on business relations and employee morale to be less likely to be significant. In 7 
 
contrast, state-owned companies are less likely to find the impact on business relations to be significant. 
Both results are consistent with the higher bargaining power that larger and state-owned firms have in the 
product market. 
Given  the  primitive  stage  of  research  in  this  area,  it  is  hard  to  draw  any  conclusions  about 
causality from these relations. Thereby, I proceed with my discussion being cautious about making causal 
claims.  However,  I  include  several  control  variables  that  might  be  operating  as  correlated  omitted 
variables  otherwise  and  design  different  tests  to  identify  plausible  mechanisms.  Moreover,  in  the 
discussion section, I describe the limitations of this study associated with the use of survey data and 
directions for future research. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the sample and the data. Section 3 
presents the results on the impact of bribery detection on competitiveness and stock price. Section 4 
describes  findings  about  the  relation  of  identity  of  the  main  perpetrator  with  detection  method  and 
organizational response after detection. Section 5 analyzes how the impact on competitiveness varies with 
the identity of the main perpetrator, detection method and organizational response after detection.  Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2.  Sample and Data 
The  sample comprises  a  set  of  companies around the  world that  are clients of  the forensic services 
practice  of  PwC.  PwC  got  responses  from  approximately  3,000  and  4,000  firms  in  2009  and  2011 
respectively.  Table  1  shows  the  frequency  of  respondents  across  countries  and  Table  2  shows  the 
frequency of respondents across sectors. In total, there are 6,806 responses out of which 2,074 responded 
that their firm had experienced an occurrence of economic crime in the past twelve months. Tables 1 and 
2 also show the number of companies in each country and sector that report that their firm was involved 
in a bribery incident. There are 519 responses that indicate the occurrence of a bribery incident. Because a 
number of respondents identify their firms to have experienced other types of economic crime, such as 
accounting fraud, insider trading, money laundering and tax fraud, I isolate responses where bribery is the 8 
 
only occurrence of economic crime in the firm. Tables 1 and 2 show the frequency across countries of 
these cases of ‘bribery-only.’ This set of 244 responses of bribery-only firms is the sample I proceed to 
analyze in the next sections. 
This sample includes firms that responded affirmatively only to the existence of bribery in their 
organizations but no other economic crime. Investigating cases where the organization has experienced 
only bribery and no other economic crime allows a cleaner identification of the costs of bribery. The 
responder was able to answer anonymously and as a result responders had little incentive not to report 
truthfully. Moreover, restricting the sample to respondents that admitted bribery avoids comparison of 
firms that admitted to bribery versus firms that might be involved in bribery but they do not admit to it. 
Making  this  comparison  would  require  an  econometrician  to  model  the  selection  bias  arising  from 
companies being involved in bribery but not admitting to it. That being said the sample is not random, 
limiting the potential generalizability of the results. The sample comprises firms that are clients of a Big 4 
audit firm, responded to the survey, and that they or outside actors detected the bribery incident. The 
results might not be generalizable to companies that are not clients of Big 4 audit firms, or that are but 
would not respond to the survey or would not anonymously admit to have been involved in a bribery 
incident, or were not capable of detecting the bribery incident. However, the sample is broader compared 
to other studies because it is not limited to firms that were caught paying bribes and firms that received 
publicity or regulatory sanctions (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2012). 
Not surprisingly, a large part of the final sample of bribery-only cases comes from emerging 
market countries where bribery is a relatively frequent phenomenon. The sample includes many firms 
from  Hungary,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  South  Africa,  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  Thailand.  These  countries’ 
representation is more frequent in my final sample compared to the initial survey sample, a finding 
consistent with corruption risk rankings provided by organizations such as Transparency International and 
the World Bank. However, there is a fair number of companies coming from developed markets where 
corruption  is  much  less  frequent,  such  as  Australia,  the  UK,  and  the  US.  The  case  of  Australia  is 
particularly interesting given that the country’s representation increases in the final sample compared to 9 
 
the survey sample. This could be attributed to a large number of Australian companies operating in 
extractive industries where corruption risk is especially high. 
 The sample not only represents more heavily high corruption countries but also the same applies 
to  sectors.  Companies  in  the  communication,  energy/utilities/mining,  engineering/construction, 
retail/consumer and transportation/logistics sectors are overrepresented in the final sample compared to 
the survey sample. This is again in line with the Briber payers ranking of Transparency International that 
identifies sectors with high corruption risk. In that index companies in the energy/utilities/mining and 
engineering/construction sectors operate in the highest corruption risk environments. 
 
3.  Impact on Competitiveness and Stock Price 
Detection of bribery has often been suggested to impact a corporation’s competitiveness. Apart from legal 
costs and fines, a negative impact on corporate reputation is one of the most frequently claimed effects 
from detection of bribery. In addition to corporate reputation, commentators have claimed that a company 
can suffer from a severe disruption in its business relations as customers and partners distance themselves 
from a troubled company (PwC 2008). Moreover, loss of talent is another potential cost. Ralph Peterson, 
the Chairman and CEO of CH2M Mill, a global engineering and construction firm with 23,000 employees 
and operations in 31 countries, claims that the high corruption risk of the engineering and construction 
industry makes the profession unattractive to young people limiting the pool of talent (PwC 2008). In 
addition, both management and staff could become distracted and demoralized as they investigate what 
went wrong and respond to legal actions. Schwepker (1999) finds that salespeople’s perception of a 
positive  ethical  climate  in  their  organization  is  positively  associated  with  job  satisfaction  and 
organizational commitment.  
Table 2 Panel A shows frequency statistics. Managers could state whether the detection of bribery 
had  a  “Significant,”  “Not  Significant  or  Insignificant,”  or  “Not  Significant”  effect  on  firm 
competitiveness in the last twelve months. 23 and 52 percent reports that the bribery incident had a 
significant and not significant effect on firm reputation. In contrast, 39 and 27 percent reports that it had a 10 
 
significant and not significant impact on employee morale. More managers report that bribery had an 
effect on business (32 percent significant and 34 percent not significant) rather than regulatory relations 
(23 percent significant and 48 percent insignificant). These results suggest that there is a fair amount of 
variation in whether bribery has affected significantly a firm’s competitiveness. Moreover, according to 
managers, the most significant impact has been on employee morale, followed by business relations and 
then on regulatory relations and reputation.  
The high significance from bribery detection on employee morale is very interesting and stands in 
contrast to surveys of managers of firms that have not experienced a bribery incident. Among these 
executives  only  eight  percent  suggested  that  the  impact  on  employees  would  be  more  or  as  severe 
compared to reputation or regulatory relations (PwC 2008). Although one could argue that this difference 
could be driven by other factors, such as differences in companies included in the sample, one explanation 
is that managers realize only after the detection of bribery how significant the impact on employee morale 
has been. 
The percentage of managers who respond that the detection of bribery had a significant impact on 
the firm’s stock price is much lower. Only nine percent respond that the impact has being significant with 
77 percent responding that it has been not significant.
3 These results are consistent with Karpoff et al. 
(2013), who find that for bribery-only cases the stock price reaction is insignificant. To better understand 
the discrepancy between the impact on stock price and competitiveness I present three-by-three tables of 
frequencies. This analysis sheds light on which competitiveness factors are more likely to be significantly 
impacted while the impact on stock price is not significant. Table 2 shows that the highest frequency of 
Low impact on stock price, High impact on Competitiveness is for employee morale   (23 percent), 
followed by business relations (17 percent) and then regulatory relations and reputation (7 and 8 percent). 
These results suggest that stock prices after th e detection of bribery do not incorporate  the impact on 
employee morale and business relations.  
                                                           
3 I only have 161 responses for stock price impact because the rest of the companies in the sample are not publically 
listed firms. 11 
 
To  provide  further  evidence  on  this  statement  I  estimate  multivariate  regressions  where  the 
dependent  variable  is  impact  on  stock  price  and  the  regressors  include  the  impact  on  the  four 
competitiveness factors. Each variable takes values from one to three where one is ‘Not Significant’ and 
three is ‘Significant.’ Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level to 
mitigate serial correlation within countries. Table 2 Panel B presents estimated coefficients and statistical 
significance both for linear and ordered logistic models. The results are similar across both specifications. 
There  is  a  statistically  significant  relation  between  impact  on  stock  price  and  impact  on  regulatory 
relations and reputation. The largest coefficient is on reputation (0.326) and then regulatory relations 
(0.182) in the linear specification. In contrast, the relation with the impact on business relations and 
employee morale is insignificant in both specifications.  
A potential explanation for the lack of relation between business relations and employee morale 
and stock price is that institutional frictions limit the competition in labor and product markets thereby 
insulating future company performance from changes in employee morale and business relations. One 
would expect that in less competitive labor markets characterized by more stringent labor regulations the 
effect of decreased employee morale is less likely to affect future profitability. In such labor markets, 
unemployment, especially among youth, is higher (Botero et al. 2004) limiting outside opportunities and 
as  a  result  decreasing  the  extent  to  which  morale  can  impact  employee  productivity.  Moreover,  in 
competitive labor markets, new firms that seek to challenge successful incumbents are able to attract labor 
at a competitive price. In contrast, if the labor market is not competitive, it will be difficult for new firms 
to attract talent, enabling profitable incumbents to sustain their performance. Consistent with this, in more 
competitive  labor  markets,  profitability  ratios  mean  revert  more  rapidly  (Healy  et  al.  2014).  I  use  a 
measure of labor market competition from Botero et al. (2004) that captures the rigidity of the labor 
market in each country through employment laws.  
Similarly, one would expect that deteriorated business relations are less likely to affect a firm’s 
future profitability and thereby its stock price in less competitive product markets. Limits to competition 
in  product  markets  are  likely  to  limit  the  propensity  of  customers  and  suppliers  to  switch  business 12 
 
partners when a firm is found to be involved in a bribery case. I use of measure of product market 
competition from Djankov et al. (2002) which is the natural logarithm of the number of steps needed to 
start a business. Both the labor and product market variables have been extensively used in the literature 
and have been validated as measures of labor and product market competition. 
Table 2 Panel C presents the results of models that include these moderating variables. I present 
specifications  where  I  only  moderate  the  effect  of  employee  morale  or  business  relations  and  a 
specification  modelling  both  moderating  effects  simultaneously.  The  effect  of  employee  morale  is 
moderated by the rigidity of the labor market. The interaction term is negative and significant since higher 
values of the labor market competition variable represent more rigid labor markets. Similarly, the effect 
of business relations on stock price is moderated by product market competition. The interaction term is 
negative and significant since higher values of the product market competition variable represent less 
competitive product markets. Now the main effects both for employee morale and business relations are 
positive and significant. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model jumps from 33 to 40 percent when 
I include the moderating variables. These results suggest that after detection of bribery stock prices might 
not react even though both business relations and employee morale have been significantly affected. The 
reason for that are, at least partly, impediments to competition in labor and product markets. 
 
4.  Main Perpetrator, Detection Method, and Organizational Response  
Table 3  Panel  A  presents  summary  statistics about  who  was  the  main  perpetrator,  how  bribing  was 
detected, and how the organization responded after detection. In 67 percent (33 percent) of the bribery 
cases the main perpetrator was internal (external). Among internal perpetrators, in 18 percent of the cases 
the main perpetrator was a senior executive of the company while in 59 percent of the cases the main 
perpetrator was a middle manager and in 23 percent a junior staff member. Among external perpetrators, 
22 percent were agents/intermediaries of the company. Twenty-eight percent of the external perpetrators 
were customers, 15 percent were suppliers, and 36 percent were government employees. 13 
 
  There are three broad categories under which methods to detect bribery can be classified. The 
first is formal control systems employed by the firm. These include anticorruption systems, internal and 
external auditing procedures, and risk management systems. The second is informal control systems that 
are descriptive of a firm’s culture. These include tips provided by people internal or external to the 
organization  and  information  coming  from  whistle-blowing  systems.  The  third  is  methods  outside 
management’s  control.  These  include  investigations  by  regulatory  and  law  enforcement  authorities, 
reports by competitors, and media investigations. Thirty-seven percent of the cases are detected by the 
formal  internal  control  systems  of  the  firm.  Another  37  percent  of  the  cases  are  discovered  by  the 
informal control systems of the firm. The rest 26 percent of the cases are discovered by actors outside the 
boundaries of the firm, such as the media, regulators, and law enforcement agencies. 
  In terms of organizational response, there are at least three actions that a firm can adopt after the 
discovery of a bribery act. These actions are not mutually exclusive. One is to pursue legal action, in 
particular civil action, against the perpetrator. Second, it can proactively inform regulatory authorities 
about the incident. Third, it can proceed to dismiss the employee or cease relations with the business 
partner who initiated the bribery act. Of course a company can choose to do nothing. In 38 percent of the 
cases the firm takes legal action against the perpetrator. In 41 percent of the cases regulators are informed 
about the bribe and in 71 percent of the cases the perpetrator is dismissed or business relations are ceased. 
The  fact  that  not  in  all  cases  relations  with  the  perpetrator  are  ceased  suggests  that  ex  post  not  all 
organizations exhibit zero tolerance against bribery.  
  Both detection method and organizational response are likely to systematically vary with the 
identity of the perpetrator. For example, internal control systems might be less effective in detecting 
bribery when the main perpetrator is a middle manager who knows how to control information that is 
coming out from the control systems of the firm. Similarly, firms might be reluctant to initiate legal action 
or to cease relations with employees of government agencies.  
Table 3 Panel A provides evidence around variability in detection method and organizational 
response by perpetrator identity. Internal perpetrators are more likely to be detected by the formal control 14 
 
systems and less likely by mechanisms outside the boundaries of the firm. Among internal perpetrators, 
middle managers are less likely to be detected by the formal control systems and more likely to be 
detected by the informal control systems of the firm or by the media or regulators. This might reflect that 
middle managers are able to circumvent formal control systems more easily because they have a better 
understanding of these systems. However, their actions might be more likely to be detected by other 
employees who then tip-off senior management. Among external employees, customers are more likely to 
be detected by the formal or informal control systems of the firm and much less likely by the media or 
regulators. The opposite applies to government employees for whom formal control systems are much 
less frequently the methods of detection. In contrast, media or regulators and law enforcement agencies 
are more frequent methods of detection. 
Companies are slightly more likely to take legal action against internal perpetrators but slightly 
less likely to inform regulators.  At the same time, companies are more likely to dismiss an internal 
perpetrator compared to ceasing relations with an external perpetrator. Among internal perpetrators the 
firm is less likely to take legal action, inform regulators or fire the perpetrator when she is a member of 
senior management. Among external perpetrators, firms rather infrequently take legal actions or cease 
relations with government employees. In contrast, they are as probable to inform regulators as they are 
when the external perpetrator is an agent or a customer. Informing regulators is a less likely response 
when the perpetrator is a supplier and as a result bribes were paid to employees of the firm. 
There is a fair amount of variation in firm size in my sample. I code a variable for firm size that 
ranges from one to four with four being the largest firms. Thirty percent of the sample is large firms that 
have  more  than  5,000  employees.  Twenty-five  percent  of  the  sample  has  between  1,000  and  5,000 
employees, 25 percent between 200 and 1,000 employees and 20 percent is small firms with up to 200 
employees. Therefore, average firm size in the sample is 2.66. Ten percent of the sample are state-owned 
enterprises. To classify a firm’s home country, I use the World Bank corruption index as a measure of a 
country’s level of corruption. Because the surveys were conducted in 2009 and 2011 and they measure 
bribery incidences in the last twelve months I use the corruption index for 2008 and 2010 respectively. 15 
 
Moreover,  I  designate  sectors  to  High,  Medium  and  Low  corruption  according  to  Transparency 
International’s bribery payers index ranking. Companies in the energy, utilities and mining, engineering 
and construction, property development and chemicals sectors are classified as High corruption risk. The 
average country corruption rating from the World Bank is -0.22 reflecting the earlier discussion that most 
of the sample is coming from corrupt countries (variables ranges from -2.5 to 2.5). Average industry 
corruption is 1.92 with High corruption sectors taking the value of three and Low corruption sectors the 
value of one.  
The main perpetrator of bribery is much more likely to be internal in larger firms. Among internal 
perpetrators, senior executives are more likely to be the main perpetrators in smaller firms. This likely 
reflects the fact that as an organization grows, senior executives delegate authority and decision rights as 
a result increasing the probability that a more junior employee is able to give or receive a bribe. Among 
external perpetrators, government employees are more likely to be the main perpetrators for larger firms. 
Presumably  the  bribes  that  they  can  receive  from  such  firms  are  larger  thereby  making  them  more 
lucrative targets for corrupt government officials. In the case of SOEs the most frequent perpetrators are 
suppliers  suggesting  that  SOEs  are  more  likely  to  receive  rather  than  pay  bribes.  There  are  some 
differences  in  country  and  industry  corruption  across  the  different  samples  but  none  is  statistically 
significant. 
 
Varying Country or Industry Corruption Risk 
Panel B presents summary statistics for subsamples of varying levels of country or sector corruption. I use 
the home country of each organization to classify them as high or low country corruption risk. I first 
discuss the results varying the level of corruption at the country level. There are no differences in internal 
perpetrator seniority across High and Low corruption countries. In contrast, in High corruption countries 
the external perpetrator is much more likely to be a government employee compared to a supplier or an 
agent. This makes sense given that in high corruption countries government officials frequently demand 
bribes. The relatively  high  frequency  of agents being  the  perpetrators  in  low  corruption  countries is 16 
 
consistent with companies from developed countries using agents when they operate in highly corrupt 
countries. 
  In  terms  of  detection  method,  when  the  perpetrator  is  internal  in  High  corruption  countries 
bribery is much more likely to be detected by formal control systems while in Low corruption countries 
by informal control systems. This finding suggests that the relative effectiveness of formal and informal 
control  systems  varies  systematically  with  the  level  of  corruption  of  a  country.  In  High  corruption 
countries employees are much less likely to feel comfortable blowing the whistle on corrupt activities 
since both incentives for doing so are lower and their ability to protect themselves is lower. 
  Firms are more likely to take legal action against perpetrators in Low corruption countries since 
in those countries the legal system is more effective and less likely to be corrupt itself. Not surprising is 
also the fact that among cases where the perpetrator is internal, it is more likely that the company informs 
regulators in Low corruption countries.  Regulators are more likely in such regions to be well organized 
and discover the bribery incident by themselves and as a result more likely to punish the firm afterwards.  
  Varying the level of corruption at the sector level also reveals some interesting differences. In 
High corruption sectors it is more likely that the perpetrator was a senior executive compared to a junior 
staff member. Because in these sectors bribing is more likely to be part of the ‘way of doing business’ it is 
also more likely that it is handled by more senior people inside the firm. Among external perpetrators, 
agents are more likely to be the perpetrators in High corruption  sectors. Because corruption is more 
endemic in these sectors firms are more likely to use agents for bribery. 
  Formal control systems are more likely to detect internal perpetrators in High corruption sectors 
while  actors  outside  the  firm,  such  as  regulators  and  the  media  are  more  likely  to  detect  internal 
perpetrators in Low corruption sectors. Non-firm actors are more likely to detect external perpetrators in 
High corruption countries where informal control systems are less likely to be effective. Firms are more 
likely to take legal action against external perpetrators and inform regulators in Low corruption sectors. 
 
5.  Variation in Competitiveness Impact 17 
 
While section 3 provided evidence on how detection of bribery impacts firm competitiveness, this section 
describes  how  the  impact  varies  with  the  characteristics  of  the  bribery  incident.  I  examine  several 
characteristics that might be related to the impact on company competitiveness from detection of bribery. 
Specifically, I consider who the perpetrator of bribery was, how the bribe was detected, how the firm 
responded after the detection of bribery, firm size, state ownership, and country and industry corruption 
risk.  
One would expect that in cases where larger bribes were involved the impact on competitiveness 
might be more significant. Larger bribes could attract more media attention and invite larger fines from 
regulators. At the same time, the size of the bribe could be correlated with variables such as the identity of 
the main perpetrator. One would expect that more senior employees would pay or receive larger bribes for 
example. Unfortunately, in the survey there are no data about the actual size of the bribe. However, I use 
a  survey  question  that  measures  “In  financial  terms,  approximately,  how  much  do  you  think  your 
organisation may have lost through incidences of all such economic crimes over the last 12 months?” as a 
proxy for the size of the bribe. Since for the sample companies in this study bribery is the only economic 
crime it refers to lost money from the bribery incident. However, this variable does not only include 
bribes that were paid but also legal costs and fines that the organization paid. It might also include lost 
revenues from customers that ceased relations with the firm. Therefore, by including this variable I am 
potentially biasing downwards the coefficients on the rests of the variables of interest because I could be 
partly controlling for deteriorated regulatory and business relations.  
I estimate ordered logistic regressions to examine the factors that are associated with the impact 
on competitiveness. This functional form is appropriate given the discrete ordinal nature of the dependent 
variable. For each dependent variable of interest, I estimate a pooled regression with bribery cases that 
have  been  initiated  either  internally  or  externally,  and  separate  regressions  for  internal  or  external 
perpetrator cases. The separate models allows for identification of the relation between the impact on firm 
competitiveness and the seniority or type of main perpetrator. 18 
 
Main Perpetrator. Internally initiated bribery might have a larger impact on the competitiveness of the 
company for multiple reasons. First, it signals that the culture and control systems inside the organization, 
which are there to prevent bribery, have failed. Therefore, detection of internally initiated bribery is more 
likely to impact the reputation of the organization by exposing the ineffectiveness of internal control 
systems and signaling that the culture of a firm is tolerant of such behavior. Similarly, it is more likely to 
impact  business  relations  with  customers  and  suppliers,  which  could  avoid  doing  business  with 
organizations  that  do  not  show  a  commitment  and  adequate  control  systems  to  avoid  corruption. 
Moreover, internally initiated bribery is more likely to impact employee morale since a fellow employee, 
rather than an outside party, was involved in illegal activity.  
Within the group of internally initiated bribery, I expect a larger impact when the initiator was 
part of the senior management. In those cases, the signal that there might be something wrong with the 
culture of the company is even stronger since the activity was initiated by a person that is a leader of the 
organization. This is especially true for employee morale. Employees are more likely to look to senior 
leadership to set the standards for individual conduct. When their expectations are not met, employees are 
likely to feel disappointed, confused, and ultimately demotivated. Moreover, the fact that they worked for 
a firm that has experienced corruption might taint their resume limiting their outside opportunities leading 
to further decrease in morale (Zahra, Priem and Rasheed 2005). 
Within the group of externally initiated bribery, I expect a larger impact when the initiator was an 
agent of the firm rather than a government employee, customer, or supplier. In cases where the initiator 
was an agent, one could argue that the agent was acting on behalf of the firm thereby resembling more of 
an  internally  initiated  bribery  act.  In  a  survey  of  business  development  directors  of  50  US  and  50 
European companies, an overwhelming majority of those surveyed stated that companies used middlemen 
such as agents, joint venture partners or foreign subsidiaries to avoid direct involvement with corruption 
either  ‘regularly’  or  ‘occasionally’  (Control  Risks  Group,  1998).  There  is  also  plenty  of  anecdotal 
evidence  which  blames  intermediary  agents,  hired  by  corporations,  for  increasing  corruption  in  the 
developing world (Wiehen 1999). 19 
 
Table 4 Panels A and B show the results of the estimation. The first few columns have models 
with reputation impact as the dependent variable. The table shows that detection of bribery is 2.8 times 
more likely to have a significant impact on a firm’s reputation if the perpetrator was internal. Moreover, 
the more senior the employee the more likely the impact will be significant. The likelihood of significant 
impact increases by 4.1 times if the perpetrator is part of senior management and by 2.8 times if the 
perpetrator is a middle manager relative to a junior staff member. Seniority is also related to the impact on 
regulatory relations. Senior executives and middle managers have a higher impact on regulatory relations 
increasing the probability of a significant impact by 3.1 and 1.5 times respectively. The same is the case 
for impact on business relations where the estimates are 2.1 and 2.6 times. In contrast, I find directionally 
consistent but not significant results for senior executives for the impact on employee morale. However, 
cases of internal perpetrators are more likely to have a significant impact on employee morale.  
I do not find consistent evidence that the type of external perpetrator is systematically associated 
with the impact on competitiveness. However, cases where the perpetrator is a government employee are 
less likely to have a significant impact on business relations. In these cases other firms might consider the 
focal firm as the victim of government expropriation and as a result they might be less likely to cease 
relations with the focal firm. Paying bribes to government officials that ask for them is an action that 
might be seen as involuntary by other firms relative to receiving bribes from suppliers, paying bribes to 
customers or using agents to pay bribes. 
Detection Method. I expect that the impact on firm competitiveness will be smaller when bribery is 
detected by a firm’s control systems. In these cases, the firm shows that it is capable of controlling illegal 
behavior from the part of its employees or business partners (PwC 2008). This can send a strong signal 
both to business partners and regulators that the firm is committed to fighting corruption and that it has 
the proper systems to do so, thereby mitigating any effect on business and regulatory relations. A stream 
of  literature  documents  the  importance  that  regulators  and  investors  are  placing  on  internal  control 
systems (Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare 2008). Detection method is less likely to impact employee 
morale, since employees are unlikely to pay attention to how bribery was detected. 20 
 
The method of detection is generally not significantly associated with impact on competitiveness. 
The one exception is when the dependent variable is impact on regulatory relations where estimated 
coefficients both on formal and informal control systems are negative and in some cases significant.  
Bribery cases that were detected by the formal and informal control systems are 0.47 and 0.51 times less 
likely  to  be  associated  with  a  significant  impact  on  regulatory  relations.  These  results  suggest  that 
regulators could take into account the quality of the internal control systems of a firm when they decide 
on disciplinary actions. 
Organizational Response. The relation between choosing to pursue legal action and firm competitiveness 
is unclear. On the one hand, pursuing legal action might be a signal that the bribery act is likely to have 
serious consequences on a firm. Similarly, a legal battle can generate negative publicity damaging a 
firm’s reputation and serving as a deterrent for customers and suppliers from doing business with the 
company. On the other hand, it can serve as a signal that the company is the victim, mitigating any 
negative  effect  on  business  relations  and  reputation.  Similarly,  ambiguous  is  the  relation  between 
informing  regulatory  authorities  and  impact  on  firm  competitiveness.  Cases  where  regulators  are 
informed are more likely to be very serious cases of bribery and as a result they are more likely to have a 
significant  effect  on  firm  competiveness.  On  the  other  hand,  especially  with  respect  to  regulatory 
relations, it could be perceived as an act of good faith where the company is willing to cooperate with the 
regulators.  The  relation  between  dismissal  and  cease  of  relation  with  the  initiator  and  firm 
competitiveness is more straightforward. Dismissing the initiator is a strong signal that the firm has zero 
tolerance against corruption. This could mitigate any negative effects on firm competitiveness.  
Both  taking  legal  action  and  informing  regulators  are  not  significantly  associated  with 
competitiveness impact. This might be because the two opposite effects cancel each other out thereby 
Dismissal of the perpetrator is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on a 
firm’s  reputation,  regulatory  relations,  and  employee  morale.  Dismissing  an  employee  reduces  the 
probability of significant impact on reputation, regulatory relations, and employee morale by 0.37, 0.56, 
and 0.60 times. Exhibiting zero tolerance against bribery and as a result firing an employee or ceasing 21 
 
relations  with  outside  parties  that  were  the  main  perpetrators  are  likely  to  reduce  the  damage  on 
reputation, regulatory relations, and employee morale. 
Firm size. I find that firm size is significantly associated with competitiveness impact. For smaller firms 
the impact particularly on business relations and employee morale is more likely to be significant. This 
might reflect the lower bargaining power that small firms have and the associated lower dependence of 
both customers and suppliers on them. Moreover, in smaller organizations where all employees know 
each other and are likely to interact with each other at the workplace or even socially, the effect from the 
discovery of bribery is more likely to demotivate employees. 
SOE. I find that detection of bribery is less likely to impact business relations for SOEs. This could reflect 
the significant power that SOEs have both because of their size and political power due to significant 
government ownership.  As a result, customers and suppliers might be more dependent on them and as a 
result less likely to limit business dealing with SOEs following a bribery incident. 
Country and Sector Corruption. I fail to find evidence of differential impact on competitiveness or stock 
price based on the level of country or sector corruption after estimating the effect of all other factors. 
While one might expect firms in low corruption countries to be more significantly influenced in a number 
of ways the results are not consistent with this hypothesis.  
Overall,  the  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that  the  identity  of  the  main  perpetrator  is 
significantly associated with the impact on firm competitiveness. Internally initiated bribery from senior 
executives  is  correlated  with  higher  likelihood  of  significant  impact.  Bribery  cases  detected  by  the 
internal control systems of the firm seem to be associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on 
regulatory relations. Finally, firms that responded by firing or ceasing business relations with the main 
perpetrator have lower likelihood of significant impact. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
While the benefits to a corporation from bribing are intuitive, the costs are less well understood. In this 
paper I analyze survey data collected from corporate managers around the world to provide evidence on 22 
 
how an organization is impacted from the discovery of bribery. I show that discovery of bribery in many 
cases significantly impacts both employee morale and business relations and less frequently reputation 
and regulatory relations. Moreover, I find, consistent with other studies, that the impact on stock price is 
most frequently insignificant, largely reflecting the fact that stock prices do not incorporate the adverse 
effect on employee morale and business relations. Although the detection of bribery significantly impacts 
employee  morale  and  business  relations,  this  impact  does  not  significantly  affect  a  firm’s  future 
profitability and risk because of frictions in labor and product markets.  
  Analyzing granular data on the identity of the main perpetrator, the method of detection and how 
an organization responds to the bribery incident uncovers interesting patterns. In general, organizations 
are less likely to take legal action and cease business relations with senior executives and government 
employees who were the main perpetrators of the bribery. Moreover, different detection methods appear 
to be more effective in uncovering perpetrators of differential seniority or type. 
Furthermore, I find that the identity of the main perpetrator is significantly associated with the 
impact on firm competitiveness. Internally initiated bribery from senior executives is correlated with 
higher likelihood of significant impact. Bribery cases detected by the internal control systems of the firm 
seem to be associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on regulatory relations. Finally, firms 
that responded by firing or ceasing business relations with the main perpetrator have lower likelihood of 
significant impact. 
While  the  analyses  reveal  interesting  patterns  in  the  data  one  potential  caveat  is  that  the 
dependent variable comprises corporate managers’ perceptions of the impact on firm competitiveness 
rather than the actual impact on competitiveness. To the extent that the two constructs are significantly 
different and perceptions are different from reality in this setting, the results should be interpreted with 
caution. If perceptions are not an accurate indication of reality then future research is needed to examine 
whether the relations documented here hold when one uses actual data on firm competitiveness. However, 
in this paper, I am interested in understanding how perceptions of impact vary with these characteristics. 
Perceptions are important because they affect managerial behavior. Managers make investment, financing 23 
 
and  operating  decisions  based  on  how  they  perceive  the  environment  around  them.  Therefore, 
understanding how their perceptions of impact on firm competitiveness vary with characteristics of the 
bribery case is likely to provide with useful evidence on how managers think of the costs of bribery. 
Moreover, an advantage of the perceptual data is that the dependent variable captures the impact on firm 
competitiveness from the detection of bribery. Research that will use actual data will need to isolate the 
effect  of  bribery  detection  and  control  for  any  other  confounding  factors  that  might  affect  a  firm’s 
competitiveness. 
There are numerous avenues for future research that explores the costs of bribery after detection. 
First, it would be useful to better understand which business relations are more likely to be affected by 
bribery cases. The effect could vary between customers and suppliers, and between large multinational 
corporations and local companies. Second, if executives believe that dismissing the initiator of the bribery 
is likely to mitigate any impact on firm competitiveness then why in some cases the initiator is not 
dismissed?  Third,  how  does  the  impact  on  firm  competitiveness  evolve  as  social,  technological  and 
political institutions change? Citizens are becoming less tolerant of corruption and the rise of the internet 
and social media allow for corruption cases to become more broadly known. Moreover, enforcement 
against  bribery  from  regulatory  authorities  has  been  increasing  from  non-existent  to  considerable. 
Understanding  how  those  larger  trends  will  influence  the  effect  of  bribery  detection  on  firm 
competitiveness is likely to increase our understanding of the phenomenon. 
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Appendix 
Variables  Description 
Reputation impact 
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's reputation from bribery 
is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if it is 
"Significant" 
Business relations impact 
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's business relations from 
bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if 
it is "Significant" 
Regulatory relations impact 
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's regulatory relations 
from bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or 
three if it is "Significant" 
Employee morale impact 
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's employee morale from 
bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if 
it is "Significant" 
Financial impact 
A variable that takes the value of one if the direct financial impact from bribery is 
"Less than $100,000", two if it is "Between $100,000 and $500,000" or three if it is 
"More than $500,000" 
Internal  A variable that takes the value of one if the bribery was initiated by a person internal 
to the organization 
Formal internal controls  A variable that takes the value of one if the bribery was detected by the formal internal 
control systems of the firm 
Informal internal controls  A variable that takes the value of one if the bribery was detected by a tip-off internal 
or external or a whistle blower 
Non-firm actors  A variable that takes the value of one if the bribery was not detected by the firm’s 
formal or informal control systems but by regulators, law enforcement or the media 
SOE  A variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a state-owned enterprise 
Firm size 
A variable that takes the value of one if the firm employees "Less than 200", two if it 
employees "Between 200 and 1,000" three if it employees "Between 1,000 and 5,000" 
and four if it employees "More than 5,000" 
Senior executives   A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was a senior 
executive of the organization 
Middle managers  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was a middle 
manager of the organization 
Junior staff  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was a junior 
staff of the organization 
Customers  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was a customer 
of the organization 
Suppliers  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was a supplier 
of the organization 
Agents  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was an 
agent/intermediary of the organization 
Government  A variable that takes the value of one if the main perpetrator of bribery was an 
employee of the government 
Legal action  A variable that takes the value of one if the organization responded to the bribery 
detection by pursuing a civil action against the initiator 
Regulators Informed  A variable that takes the value of one if the organization responded to the bribery 
detection by informing regulators 
Dismiss Perpetrator  A variable that takes the value of one if the organization responded to the bribery 
detection by firing (ceasing business relations) the internal (external) perpetrator 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Number of Observations by Country 
Country  Full 
Sample  %  Economic 
Crime Only  % 
Bribe & Other 
Economic 
Crime 
%  Bribe 
Only  % 
Andorra  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Angola  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Argentina  114  1.67%  47  2.27%  10  1.93%  2  0.82% 
Australia  154  2.26%  66  3.18%  13  2.50%  9  3.69% 
Austria  41  0.60%  7  0.34%  2  0.39%  1  0.41% 
Belgium  144  2.12%  45  2.17%  9  1.73%  6  2.46% 
Bolivia  3  0.04%  2  0.10%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Botswana  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Brazil  172  2.53%  51  2.46%  8  1.54%  5  2.05% 
Bulgaria  117  1.72%  28  1.35%  12  2.31%  6  2.46% 
Canada  102  1.50%  43  2.07%  3  0.58%  1  0.41% 
Chile  76  1.12%  16  0.77%  5  0.96%  0  0.00% 
China  14  0.21%  3  0.14%  2  0.39%  0  0.00% 
Colombia  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Croatia  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Cyprus  6  0.09%  3  0.14%  1  0.19%  0  0.00% 
Czech Republic  167  2.45%  41  1.98%  11  2.12%  3  1.23% 
Denmark  221  3.25%  59  2.84%  5  0.96%  1  0.41% 
Dominican Republic  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Ecuador  11  0.16%  8  0.39%  1  0.19%  1  0.41% 
Estonia  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  5  0.96%  0  0.00% 
Finland  113  1.66%  25  1.21%  2  0.39%  3  1.23% 
France  163  2.39%  63  3.04%  1  0.19%  1  0.41% 
Germany  55  0.81%  3  0.14%  4  0.77%  1  0.41% 
Ghana  54  0.79%  15  0.72%  0  0.00%  4  1.64% 
Greece  186  2.73%  33  1.59%  12  2.31%  4  1.64% 
Hong Kong  74  1.09%  12  0.58%  6  1.16%  5  2.05% 
Hungary  138  2.03%  37  1.78%  22  4.24%  10  4.10% 
India  251  3.69%  50  2.41%  20  3.85%  7  2.87% 
Indonesia  133  1.95%  18  0.87%  6  1.16%  4  1.64% 
Ireland  166  2.44%  41  1.98%  1  0.19%  0  0.00% 
Israel  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Italy  213  3.13%  37  1.78%  2  0.39%  1  0.41% 
Japan  142  2.09%  10  0.48%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Kenya  143  2.10%  89  4.29%  22  4.24%  5  2.05% 
Liberia  5  0.07%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Lithuania  6  0.09%  4  0.19%  3  0.58%  2  0.82% 
Luxembourg  3  0.04%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Malaysia  156  2.29%  55  2.65%  20  3.85%  10  4.10% 
Mexico  268  3.94%  110  5.30%  28  5.39%  12  4.92% 
Middle East  135  1.98%  38  1.83%  16  3.08%  6  2.46% 
Moldavia  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Montenegro  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 28 
 
Namibia  3  0.04%  1  0.05%  1  0.19%  1  0.41% 
Netherlands  112  1.65%  14  0.68%  2  0.39%  1  0.41% 
New Zealand  177  2.60%  82  3.95%  4  0.77%  4  1.64% 
Nigeria  2  0.03%  1  0.05%  1  0.19%  1  0.41% 
Norway  139  2.04%  36  1.74%  7  1.35%  4  1.64% 
Papua New Guinea  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  1  0.19%  0  0.00% 
Peru  18  0.26%  7  0.34%  3  0.58%  2  0.82% 
Philippines  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Poland  140  2.06%  49  2.36%  15  2.89%  6  2.46% 
Portugal  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Romania  130  1.91%  27  1.30%  12  2.31%  3  1.23% 
Russia  210  3.09%  102  4.92%  45  8.67%  22  9.02% 
Serbia  18  0.26%  5  0.24%  1  0.19%  1  0.41% 
Sierra Leone  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Singapore  68  1.00%  10  0.48%  4  0.77%  1  0.41% 
Slovakia  152  2.23%  36  1.74%  5  0.96%  3  1.23% 
Slovenia  47  0.69%  7  0.34%  4  0.77%  1  0.41% 
South Africa  183  2.69%  106  5.11%  50  9.63%  20  8.20% 
South Korea  1  0.01%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Spain  139  2.04%  57  2.75%  15  2.89%  5  2.05% 
Sudan  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Swaziland  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  1  0.19%  0  0.00% 
Sweden  150  2.20%  25  1.21%  5  0.96%  3  1.23% 
Switzerland  265  3.89%  42  2.03%  4  0.77%  3  1.23% 
Taiwan  2  0.03%  0  0.00%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Thailand  103  1.51%  29  1.40%  15  2.89%  13  5.33% 
Tunisia  2  0.03%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Turkey  106  1.56%  17  0.82%  3  0.58%  0  0.00% 
UK  400  5.88%  179  8.63%  17  3.28%  8  3.28% 
USA  225  3.31%  90  4.34%  8  1.54%  3  1.23% 
Ukraine  148  2.17%  58  2.80%  35  6.74%  20  8.20% 
Venezuela  84  1.23%  20  0.96%  5  0.96%  5  2.05% 
Vietnam  19  0.28%  6  0.29%  4  0.77%  4  1.64% 
Zambia  1  0.01%  1  0.05%  0  0.00%  0  0.00% 
Total  6,806     2,074     519     244    
   29 
 
Table 1 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Sector 
Industry  Full 
sample  % 
Economic 
Crime 
Only 
% 
Bribe & 
Other 
Economic 
Crime 
%  Bribe 
Only  % 
Aerospace and defense  45  0.33%  12  0.29%  2  0.19%  1  0.20% 
Automotive  284  2.09%  67  1.62%  18  1.73%  6  1.23% 
Chemicals  150  1.10%  25  0.60%  8  0.77%  4  0.82% 
Communication  192  1.41%  86  2.07%  33  3.18%  17  3.48% 
Education  41  0.30%  13  0.31%  3  0.29%  1  0.20% 
Energy, utilities and mining  493  3.62%  131  3.16%  54  5.20%  32  6.56% 
Engineering and construction  428  3.14%  113  2.72%  47  4.53%  22  4.51% 
Entertainment and media  189  1.39%  58  1.40%  10  0.96%  3  0.61% 
Financial services  1165  8.56%  496  11.96%  87  8.38%  21  4.30% 
Food related  55  0.40%  11  0.27%  2  0.19%  2  0.41% 
Government related  358  2.63%  139  3.35%  31  2.99%  13  2.66% 
Health and care  36  0.26%  18  0.43%  3  0.29%  1  0.20% 
Hospitality and leisure  131  0.96%  58  1.40%  8  0.77%  4  0.82% 
Insurance  330  2.42%  151  3.64%  26  2.50%  10  2.05% 
Manufacturing  886  6.51%  183  4.41%  56  5.39%  28  5.74% 
Pharmaceuticals and life sciences  328  2.41%  68  1.64%  15  1.45%  12  2.46% 
Professional services  408  3.00%  68  1.64%  19  1.83%  9  1.84% 
Property  59  0.43%  11  0.27%  4  0.39%  4  0.82% 
Retail and consumer  582  4.28%  219  5.28%  57  5.49%  34  6.97% 
Technology  334  2.45%  45  1.08%  8  0.77%  3  0.61% 
Transportation and logistics  312  2.29%  102  2.46%  28  2.70%  17  3.48% 
Total  6,806     2,074     519     244    
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Table 2 
Panel A: Frequency Distributions of Impact from Detection of Bribery 
   Employee morale impact     Business relations impact 
      Low  Medium  High        Low  Medium  High 
S
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
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e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
Low  19%  34%  23% 
 
Low  29%  30%  17% 
Medium  2%  5%  7% 
 
Medium  3%  5%  6% 
High  1%  1%  7% 
 
High  1%  1%  8% 
                  Regulatory relations impact     Reputation impact 
 
Low  Medium  High 
   
Low  Medium  High 
Low  44%  20%  12% 
 
Low  49%  18%  9% 
Medium  1%  9%  5% 
 
Medium  3%  7%  4% 
High  1%  1%  7%     High  1%  1%  8% 
 
Panel B: Determinants of Stock Price Impact 
Dependent Variable  Stock Price Impact 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  Chi-square 
Employee Morale Impact  0.026  0.45  0.137  0.19 
Business Relations Impact  0.031  0.47  0.087  0.05 
Regulatory Relations Impact  0.182  2.70  0.979  9.72 
Reputation Impact  0.326  4.44  1.290  21.83 
R-squared  33.49% 
 
40.50% 
  N  161     161    
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Panel C: Determinants of Stock Price Impact and the Moderating Effect of Market Competition 
Dependent Variable  Stock price impact 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Employee Morale Impact  0.294  2.36  0.029  0.52  0.298  2.41 
Business Relations Impact  0.016  0.23  1.352  1.91  1.663  2.36 
Regulatory Relations Impact  0.199  2.99  0.196  2.93  0.218  3.40 
Reputation Impact  0.331  4.67  0.327  4.36  0.334  4.65 
Labor market competition  0.097  0.31      0.037  0.12 
Employee Morale Impact x Labor market competition  -0.567  -2.17      -0.576  -2.21 
Product market competition      0.174  1.14  0.262  1.78 
Business Relations Impact x Product market competition       -0.235  -1.92  -0.292  -2.41 
R-squared  38.14%    34.28%    39.83%   
N  158     160     158    
 
Panel A shows frequency statistics of the significance of the bribery incident on competitiveness factors and stock price. The first specification of Panel B is 
estimated using an ordinary least squares model. The second specification of Panel B is estimated using an ordinary logistic model. All specifications in Panel C 
are estimated using ordinary least squares models. Labor market competition is an index of the rigidity of the labor market in a country. Higher values represent 
less competitive labor markets. Product market competition is an index of the number of steps required to set up and conduct business in a country. Higher values 
represent less competitive product markets. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Perpetrator Identity, Detection Method, Organizational Response and Other Characteristics  
 
            Internal  External 
 Perpetrators Included  All  Internal  External  Senior 
executives 
Middle 
managers 
Junior 
staff  Customers   Suppliers  Agents  Government 
Perpetrators                     
   Internal  67%                   
      Senior executives    18%                 
      Middle managers    58%                 
      Junior staff    23%                 
   External  33%                   
      Customers      28%               
      Suppliers      15%               
      Agents      21%               
      Government      36%               
                     
Detection Method                     
Formal control systems  37%  39%  33%  50%  31%  50%  41%  33%  35%  24% 
Informal control systems  37%  37%  36%  33%  41%  32%  41%  33%  35%  34% 
Non-firm actors  26%  24%  31%  17%  28%  18%  18%  33%  29%  41% 
                     
Organizational Response                     
Legal action  38%  39%  35%  27%  42%  42%  50%  42%  47%  14% 
Inform regulators  41%  39%  46%  30%  40%  45%  50%  25%  59%  45% 
Dismiss perpetrator  71%  84%  44%  70%  86%  89%  55%  58%  65%  17% 
                     
Other Characteristics                     
Firm size  2.66  2.86  2.24  2.73  2.83  3.03  2.09  2.08  2.18  2.45 
SOE  0.10  0.12  0.08  0.13  0.09  0.16  0.05  0.25  0.06  0.03 
Country corruption  -0.22  -0.26  -0.14  0.00  -0.35  -0.23  -0.18  -0.50  -0.41  0.19 
Industry corruption  1.92  1.98  1.80  2.10  1.97  1.92  1.68  1.83  2.00  1.76 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics of Perpetrator Identity, Detection Method, and Organizational Response by Country or Industry Corruption 
 
 Sample Includes 
Low 
corruption 
country 
High 
corruption 
country 
Low 
corruption 
country 
High 
corruption 
country 
Low 
corruption 
industry 
High 
corruption 
industry 
Low 
corruption 
industry 
High 
corruption 
industry 
 Perpetrators Included  Internal  Internal  External  External  Internal  Internal  External  External 
Perpetrators                 
   Internal                 
      Senior executives  17%  19%      17%  23%     
      Middle managers  60%  58%      58%  59%     
      Junior staff  23%  23%      25%  18%     
   External                 
      Customers      26%  28%      29%  22% 
      Suppliers      21%  13%      15%  17% 
      Agents      32%  18%      19%  28% 
      Government      21%  41%      37%  33% 
                 
Detection Method                 
Formal control systems  29%  43%  37%  31%  36%  48%  32%  33% 
Informal control systems  52%  31%  37%  36%  38%  36%  39%  28% 
Non-firm actors  19%  26%  26%  33%  27%  16%  29%  39% 
                 
Organizational Response                 
Legal action  44%  37%  42%  33%  39%  39%  39%  22% 
Inform regulators  56%  32%  42%  48%  42%  32%  50%  33% 
Dismiss perpetrator  88%  83%  42%  44%  80%  84%  42%  50% 
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4 
Panel A: Reputation and Regulatory Relations 
 
Ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors are clustered by country. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Variables
Predicted 
Sign
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Predicted 
Sign
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Perpetrator
Internal + 1.025 0.003 + 0.211 0.532
Senior executives + 1.417 0.018 + 1.147 0.051
Middle managers + 1.044 0.025 + 0.912 0.069
Customers  +/- -0.385 0.609  +/- -0.679 0.445
Suppliers  +/- -0.159 0.874  +/- 1.068 0.363
Agents - -0.442 0.606  +/- -0.403 0.678
Detection Method
Formal control systems - 0.309 0.376 0.392 0.396 0.470 0.492 - -0.761 0.039 -0.508 0.297 -1.202 0.140
Informal control systems - 0.052 0.886 -0.162 0.723 0.229 0.747 - -0.669 0.060 -0.713 0.100 -0.909 0.192
Organizational Response
Legal action  +/- 0.262 0.384 0.255 0.500 0.960 0.184  +/- -0.233 0.467 -0.560 0.154 0.556 0.463
Inform regulators  +/- 0.106 0.722 0.374 0.335 -0.212 0.743  +/- 0.512 0.115 0.763 0.057 0.561 0.419
Dismiss perpetrator - -1.005 0.004 -0.998 0.063 -1.079 0.069 - -0.576 0.100 -0.971 0.079 -0.538 0.398
Firm Characteristics
Firm size  +/- -0.283 0.041 -0.240 0.220 -0.220 0.394  +/- -0.094 0.491 0.035 0.860 -0.041 0.889
SOE  +/- -0.125 0.802 -0.296 0.608 0.467 0.739 - -0.148 0.781 -0.198 0.749 -1.496 0.365
Corruption
Country corruption  +/- -0.154 0.260 -0.297 0.091 0.184 0.530  +/- 0.107 0.451 -0.062 0.733 0.559 0.081
Sector corruption  +/- 0.094 0.594 -0.052 0.825 0.480 0.165  +/- 0.045 0.810 -0.122 0.614 0.665 0.111
Controls
Bribe size + 0.675 0.003 0.469 0.113 0.664 0.124 + 0.512 0.028 0.450 0.141 0.398 0.374
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 237 158 79 220 148 72
Percent Concordant 66% 71% 70% 67% 69% 75%
R-squared 13% 20% 20% 13% 18% 31%
All Internal External
Reputation impact Regulatory relations impact
All Internal External35 
 
Panel B: Business Relations and Employee Morale 
 
Ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors are clustered by country. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Variables
Predicted 
Sign
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Predicted 
Sign
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Perpetrator
Internal + 0.319 0.341 + 0.524 0.095
Senior executives + 0.723 0.076 + 0.106 0.839
Middle managers + 0.946 0.034 + -0.184 0.649
Customers + 0.822 0.100  +/- 0.226 0.747
Suppliers + 2.241 0.018  +/- 0.781 0.323
Agents + 1.075 0.090  +/- -0.719 0.383
Detection Method
Formal control systems - -0.337 0.335 -0.214 0.648 -0.212 0.761 - 0.192 0.548 -0.068 0.878 0.616 0.329
Informal control systems - -0.314 0.362 -0.306 0.484 -0.383 0.594 - 0.346 0.299 -0.066 0.880 1.475 0.039
Organizational Response
Legal action  +/- 0.437 0.160 0.991 0.010 -1.103 0.077  +/- -0.106 0.704 0.010 0.976 -0.233 0.653
Inform regulators  +/- -0.295 0.306 -0.330 0.359 -0.181 0.783  +/- 0.222 0.440 0.211 0.570 0.590 0.358
Dismiss perpetrator - -0.093 0.782 -0.087 0.862 0.060 0.916 - -0.512 0.114 0.030 0.951 -0.884 0.126
Firm Characteristics
Firm size - -0.495 0.000 -0.608 0.004 -0.106 0.674 - -0.399 0.003 -0.601 0.003 -0.175 0.497
SOE - -0.847 0.098 -0.979 0.089 -1.179 0.529  +/- 0.057 0.901 0.176 0.745 -0.393 0.731
Corruption
Country corruption - -0.149 0.275 -0.203 0.237 0.261 0.377 - 0.119 0.381 0.001 0.995 0.418 0.170
Sector corruption  +/- 0.201 0.251 0.253 0.260 0.073 0.826 - 0.133 0.433 0.288 0.171 -0.141 0.653
Controls
Bribe size + 0.690 0.001 0.635 0.027 0.853 0.044 + 0.411 0.037 0.357 0.189 0.927 0.037
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 160 75 237 158 79
Percent Concordant 68% 72% 73% 63% 65% 72%
R-squared 15% 23% 25% 9% 12% 26%
Business relations impact Employee morale impact
All Internal External All Internal External